We must stop pretending the EU is a great power

This is a tale of two delusional think tank meetings I have recently attended, illustrating how far gone is most political risk analysis regarding the status of the EU. Cheerleading has taken the place of thinking, as the simple fact is that Brussels is funding many of the supposedly independent observers at such conclaves. To expect critical thinking from “experts” whose financial imperatives revolve around keeping the EU’s mandarins happy is to expect too much.

At the first meeting, I found myself sitting on a panel with an American Wilsonian. He was representing the Democratic Party view of US relations with China, while I represented the Republican Party view. After a good discussion, questions came from the primarily European audience. The first revolved around the fact that the questioner wanted to know where the EU fits into the strategic picture of the Sino-American cold war, as wasn’t it so that Brussels must be counted as the world’s third great superpower?

Even though it was a Zoom call, my Wilsonian counterpart — whom I agreed with over almost nothing — and I exchanged ironic glances. Finally, for all his innate pro-EU inclinations, he brutally told the questioner the truth: The EU, while a trading superpower and a huge internal market, simply doesn’t play at the global strategic level as a great power (let alone a superpower), as it is less and less economically dynamic, is endemically politically divided and is militarily (other than France) impotent. In the shocked silence that followed, I quipped that I wanted to cede all my time to my Democratic counterpart for having the temerity to tell the brainwashed audience the truth — that the EU simply isn’t a great power.

If this is so, my second think tank meeting focused on the nub of the problem: A mercantilist, neutralist, isolationist-leaning Germany. In standard fashion, the German think tank denizen sent to debate me made all the usual excuses; while I am right to be critical, Germany (in that most galling of phrases) “would now do its homework,” easily overcoming a generation’s-worth of historical and empirical evidence to the contrary, and would decisively right its ship of state over the coming months.

Exasperated, and tired of the analytical lying at cocktail parties, I brutally interjected that the reality is that Germany would do nothing over the next year and change nothing, as its people prefer their cosseted lifestyle (and genteel decline) to the real sacrifices that would be involved in paying for a relevant military and crafting a common European foreign policy. I was met by hateful stares and a sullen, unchallenged silence, for what could they say, given the last decades of Berlin’s holiday from history?

Crises intellectually clarify, even for the most obtuse observers. Two recent challenges to Brussels from the world’s revisionist powers, China and Russia, ought to make plain that wishful thinking has taken the place of facts-based political risk assessments of an EU that is so much less than meets the eye.

First, tiny Lithuania — to the fury of Beijing — has decided to favor Taiwan in the crafting of its foreign and economic policy. China responded by putting pressure on Vilnius and defying the EU, particularly Germany, to do anything about this. While in the past few days, the EU launched a legal action against China at the World Trade Organization (WTO) after Beijing restricted or blocked imports from and exports to Lithuania, Berlin responded precisely as I would have predicted — that is, in a neutralist, isolationist, mercantilist manner — and not as EU cheerleaders would have it. Glumly aware, as an export-driven superpower, that China, for the fifth year in a row, is its largest export destination, Germany is pressing Brussels to tone down its criticism of China and to de-escalate the controversy.

Major German companies, particularly carmakers heavily dependent on trade with Beijing, have warned Vilnius that they will pull out of Lithuania unless the dispute is quickly settled. For, despite all its usual blather about how much the EU means to it, when push comes to shove and with its now economic interests on the line, Berlin has seen to its commercial interests  at the expense of European unity.

Likewise, over the Ukraine crisis, in a basic way President Vladimir Putin is airing his grievances. As such, in the earliest days of the crisis, Moscow met with the US, NATO and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, not with the EU.

Why should he? In practical terms, Moscow met great power to superpower (the US), with the world’s most important military alliance (NATO) and with the largest gathering of transatlantic states (the OSCE). The EU simply does not play a major role in strategic terms; for Putin to prioritize meeting with Brussels would have been a colossal waste of time. While a shocked Brussels looked impotently on (and I am shocked that they are shocked), Putin made it clear that, in a crisis, the EU simply does not have the relevance its cheerleaders dream of. Nor is this state of affairs likely to change.

Instead of swallowing comforting, if delusional, fairy tales about its far-flung importance, it is time to analytically shout from the rooftops the obvious: That the EU emperor simply isn’t wearing any clothes.

This post was originally published in Arab News.

A realistic approach may help master the crisis in Ukraine

At present, the only great power combination that can really threaten America’s global position in our new age is an ironclad alliance between revisionist powers China and Russia. And, for all their shared antipathy to the U.S., and for all that they strategically tilt toward one another, Beijing and Moscow are not there yet.

Russian resentment at taking a back seat to China does not fit comfortably with President Vladimir Putin’s Great Russian nationalism. On the other hand, China’s desire to economically — and eventually, militarily — challenge Russia for dominance in Central Asia does not make the two easy bedfellows. At the highest level, all American foreign policy must be about not throwing its two rivals into each other’s arms.

Of the two, China — the only possible peer superpower competitor — is the greater threat. Given that Russia is an uneasy part of Western civilization, it also makes it a better long-term option to pry away from the dangerous, putative Sino-Russian alliance. Even the outspoken Russia critic, former acting director of the CIA Michael Morell, recently said that “it is too bad we cannot have closer relations with Russia, because it could be a strategic partner with us against China.” This is why it is overwhelmingly in America’s interests, if it can be managed, to avoid open conflict with Russia over the Ukraine crisis.  

But how does this long-term geostrategic reality mesh with the immediate crisis in Ukraine? To be clear, the harsh, recent U.S.-Russia negotiations had an old, Cold War vibe. However, there are important differences between now and then. The current conflicts with the Kremlin are about Russia’s real or imagined security phobias and idiosyncrasies, not a fight over competing global ideologies. This is a new great power struggle, but not an ideological battle. As such, theoretically, the chasm between the two could be bridged.

Second, present weaknesses in the Western alliance are only spurring on Putin, even before Russia strikes. De facto neutralist Germany took unplugging the Kremlin from the global SWIFT banking system off the table, and the new governing coalition of Olaf Scholz is hedging on Germany’s earlier commitment not to allow the massive Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipeline between Russia and Germany to come online in the case of Russian invasion.

President Biden, in his news conference last week, suggested that a limited invasion might trigger only limited sanctions. Such weakness is no way to make fraught negotiations work. 

Instead, Washington and all the NATO allies must make it clear to Moscow that no effective “win-win” negotiations can be undertaken with the Russian military threat imminent. Any significant U.S. step toward Russia under current circumstances would be interpreted as just another sign of weakness by the Biden administration.

Instead, allowing that a cooling-off period can be managed, negotiations should be held with the clear intention to strengthen America’s geopolitical posture, while proposing to Russia a fair deal.

Some of Russia’s concerns can be acknowledged, in terms of verbal understandings, if not treaty obligations. George Friedman put it explicitly: “Russia has been invaded in the 17th century by the Swedes, in the 19th century by the French and in the 20th century twice by the Germans. In each case, they won the war or survived it by strategic depth.” 

Obviously, Ukraine is the number one priority for Russia, as far as a goal to reinstate some of the strategic depth lost with the fall of the USSR. They fear that another sudden outburst of aggression will — as it has done time and again — come from Europe, and they will have to defend themselves on frontlines dangerously close to Moscow. This is particularly relevant in our era of hypersonic missiles.

But the U.S. should make clear to the Kremlin that Russia’s neighbors also have an understandable historical dread of Russian aggression. Such trepidations may be alleviated by the further expansion of NATO to their territory, if they so wish, and when all other NATO members agree — which (crucially) so far, they do not. We must remind Putin that no NATO expansion to the East has happened since 2009 because of Germany’s and France’s fervent opposition, and that this is unlikely to change. While the U.S. cannot give in on the theory of further NATO expansion, reality can be directly conveyed to the Russian delegation. In practice, politically there is absolutely no appetite in the alliance for expansion to Russia’s borders, nor will it occur in the near term.

Leading European NATO powers (Germany, France and Italy) openly oppose further NATO expansion. This is not only because of the energy crisis and the German dependence on Russian gas but also because of their long-term interest in developing Russian markets and natural resources. The last thing any of these states wishes to do is to take a stick to the Russian beehive.

Putin’s preference, in time-honored Russian fashion, is to secure the country’s western borders. Negotiations on a renewed European security system could offer Russia enough strategically and tie Moscow’s hands for many years while the intricacies of a compact are developed, greatly reducing the dangerous incentive for it to form a military-political alliance with China.

The Russian proverb says that “a bad peace is better than a good war” — especially if the war can escalate in an age of nuclear weapons. Instead, a realistic approach could allow us time to find solutions acceptable to both sides, including agreements on limitations of strategic weapons deployment in Eastern Europe, military maneuvers, and offensive arms sales to Russian neighbors.

Quiet, realistic understandings, short of flashy treaties that are impossible to pass in the U.S. Congress, may be possible regarding NATO’s Eastern borderlands. Given the geostrategic stakes in play, thinking creatively is worth the effort.

This post was originally published in The Hill.

To avoid calamity with Russia, the US must help Ukrainians to help themselves

If the 20th century teaches us anything, it must be that either you master history or history masters you. In his 2014 book, “The Sleepwalkers,” historian Christopher Clark makes it tragically plain that “the protagonists of 1914 were sleepwalkers … blind to the reality of the horror they were about to bring into the world.”

By taking their eye off the ball over what seemed yet another minor Balkan crisis — following the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo — Western statesmen neglected to take seriously a calamity that would come to sweep away their glorious belle epoque world, at the cost of 20 million deaths in the charnel house of World War I.

Today’s statesmen simply must do better than what happened during that fateful summer of 1914. For now, Presidents Biden and Putin have avoided a massive escalation between the U.S. and Russia, but systemic challenges plaguing Eastern Europe’s borderlands remain.

The West must not be caught sleepwalking again.

What can the U.S. do to avert this coming storm? First, we must clearly understand the geostrategic stakes. Ukraine is ground zero in this conflict. Ideally, Putin hopes to grab Kyiv and subjugate Ukraine as a vassal state. The second-best outcome for the Russian president is that his current brinkmanship yields fruit in the form of panicky Western appeasement. 

His price for pulling back? A Russian veto over any further eastern expansion of NATO. Whatever one thinks of further NATO membership, Washington must categorically reject this. The U.S. is an autonomous superpower; it does not let other countries tell it who it can, and cannot, ally with. To give Russia such control over U.S. foreign policy would telegraph to the rest of the world that America has embarked upon a dangerous new age of isolation. This would have long-term consequences in the global balance of power to the detriment of the U.S.

Putin’s third best strategic option is Ukraine as a domestic basket case, refuting the very notion that an aspiring Eastern European country’s westward tilt can yield independence, prosperity and democracy. Putin can live with each of these three strategic outcomes. It is up to Biden to deny him these clearly articulated goals. 

Ukraine’s resurgence rests on a three-legged policy stool: a resurgent military, a vibrant domestic political scene, and an autonomous energy policy. While much attention has been focused on the first, equally important is the United States’s involvement in helping to nurture the latter two imperatives.

In terms of domestic politics, that means America must remind novice President Volodymyr Zelensky that personality-driven populism is a dangerous road for him to travel upon. Zelensky was catapulted to the Ukrainian presidency by virtue of the character he played in the popular political satire, “Servant of the People.” In it, a decent, ordinary schoolteacher, Vasyl Holoborodko, remakes Ukraine’s murky politics. Coming to office with a broad mandate for change, Zelensky won an overwhelming 73 percent of the vote in the Ukraine presidential election. But, after taking office in May 2019 — much as has proven true for political populist amateurs around the world — Zelensky has found governing harder than satire.

Now, more than two years into his term, Zelensky has run into real political difficulty. An October poll taken by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology found the president’s approval rating has plummeted to a subterranean 25 percent, and 59 percent of the voters don’t trust him. 

First, the leaked Pandora Papers revealed that Zelensky held several offshore financial holdings in the British Virgin Islands, Cyprus and Belize — hardly the actions of a scourge of the oligarchs. Second, he sacked his youthful reformist ally, Dmytro Rozumkov, from his position as speaker of the Rada, Ukraine’s parliament. 

Third, Zelensky has chosen to pick a fight with Ukraine’s richest businessman, who is a major player in the country’s media and energy sectors. While government figures long have been welcome on his television stations, recently opposition political figures have appeared on his programs more often. This seems the likely cause of this unedifying fight; Zelensky is growing thin-skinned when it comes to the absolutely pivotal notion of freedom of the press and would like to have unfettered opportunities to promote his agenda in any media in the country. This conflict in the face of the imminent Russia threat undermines Ukraine’s security.

For all these reasons, the U.S. must support Ukraine robustly, while reminding Zelensky that America supports the country’s democratic future, rather than the personal prospects of any one man.

Lastly, Ukraine must deal with its looming energy crisis. Perilously, more than half of the country’s electricity is produced at aging, state-owned nuclear power plants, run on Russian fuel. In another sign of Ukraine’s dependence on Moscow, only one of these power plants has its own fuel storage facility; the rest are bound to export their waste for storage in Russia. An overwhelming 70 percent of Ukraine’s coal imports comes from Russia. 

Rather than push through the necessary reforms, the Zelensky government is accusing DTEK, a private company that manages a large part of Ukraine’s thermal generation, of poor planning for the winter to come. But, as DTEK CEO Maxim Timchenko put it, “As we approach winter every year, we cannot assume that we have a crisis. We need to prepare for winter in advance.”

The Ukrainian government, which accumulated large debts to energy producers from renewable sources since 2020, has recently paid these off, with the exception of DTEK’s, which is a major investor in this sector. 

Over the pivotal energy issue, the U.S. has a large policy role to play here, sustaining Ukraine’s energy (and thus political) independence. The Biden administration should strongly support Kyiv’s efforts to integrate its energy grid with European Union energy markets as soon as possible. Otherwise, Putin can turn on and off the power to Kyiv at will. Predictably, on Nov. 1, that is what he did — the Kremlin stopped thermal coal exports to Ukraine just as the cold winter is setting in. 

It is time to end America’s passive approach to the coming crisis in Ukraine. The best way to avoid sleepwalking into calamity is to swiftly and decisively help Kyiv to help itself, in order for a far more resilient Ukraine to meet the perilous times ahead.

This blog post was originally published in The Hill.