The Godfather Doctrine: A Foreign Policy Parable (Part 7: Creating a New Order)

While addressing the family’s immediate need for a more versatile policy tool kit and shoring up teetering alliances, Michael also takes steps to adjust the institutional playing field to the Corleones’ advantage on a more fundamental, long-term basis. Where Tom sees institutions as essentially static edifices that act as a source of power in their own right, and Sonny sees them as needless hindrances to be bypassed, Michael sees institutions for what they truly are: Conduits of influence that ‘reflect and ratify’ but do not supplant deeper power realities. When the distribution of power shifts, institutions are sure to follow. As the Tattaglias and the Barzinis gain strength, Michael knows they will eventually overturn the existing order and replace it with an institutional rule book that better reflects their own needs and interests.

Evidence that this process is already under way can be seen in the ease with which Sollozzo is able to enlist the support of a local precinct captain—the Mafia equivalent of a UN mandate—when police loyalties formerly belonged to the Corleones. Similarly, Washington increasingly finds the very institutions it created after World War II being used against it by today’s rising powers, even as new structures are being built (like the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation) that exclude the United States as a participant altogether.

Rather than ignoring this phenomenon, as Tom does, or, like Sonny, launching a frontal assault against it, Michael sees it as a hidden opportunity. For Michael knows that if the family will act decisively, before the Tattaglias and the Barzinis have acquired a commanding margin of power, it can re-arrange the existing institutional setup in ways that satisfy the new power centres but still serve vital Corleone interests. This he does through a combination of accommodation (dropping the family’s resistance to narcotics and granting the other families access to the Corleones’ coveted New York political machinery) and institutional retrenchment (shifting the family business to Nevada and giving the other families a stake in the Corleones’ new moneymaker, Las Vegas gambling). In this way, he is able to give would-be rivals renewed incentives to bandwagon with, rather than balance against, the Corleone empire, while forcing them to deal with Michael on his own terms.

A similar technique could prove very useful for America in anticipating and preparing the way for the emergence of its Tattaglias and Barzinis, the BRICS. In the years ahead, Washington should pursue, as a matter of overriding strategic priority, the renovation and expansion of the Bretton Woods system as a first step toward incorporating the BRICS into a rules-based American world. Such an effort at pre-emptive institutional regrouping, with decision-making predicated on new global power realities, is vital if the new great power competitors are to eschew the temptation to position themselves as revolutionary powers in the new system. Doing so now, while the transition from the old system to multipolarity is still underway and before the wet cement of the new order has hardened, could help to ensure that, while it no longer enjoys the privileged status of hegemon, America is still able to position itself, like the Corleones, as the next best thing: Primus inter pares—’first among equals.’

Such an approach will require Washington to emulate Michael’s cool, dispassionate courage in the face of epochal change and to avoid living in the comforting embrace of the past, as both Tom and Sonny ultimately did. For in the end, Michael’s strategic goal is that of America—to preserve its position in a dangerous world.

Johnson will never be able to overcome his Marie Antoinette problem

It is one of the most famous historical anecdotes in history and the prime example of a self-centered ruling elite narcissistically out of touch with its suffering people. When told of the fact that the hard-pressed peasants could no longer afford to buy their staple of bread, Marie Antoinette, the bubble-headed queen of pre-revolutionary France, supposedly said, “Let them eat cake.” The only problem with this telling, damning story is that there is absolutely no evidence that she ever said anything of the sort, with the whole fabricated incident most likely conjured up fully 50 years after the French Revolution.

But what makes the story memorable, and why it has lasted, is that she could well have said something exactly along those lines. The French aristocracy, mired in crippling debt and addicted to a lifestyle the country simply could no longer afford, quickly collapsed under its own weight in the late 1780s-early 1790s precisely because the famous quote does sum up its oblivious attitude. The story has stuck because, while technically not factual, it exposes a greater truth about the decadent French ruling elite and why history swept it away.

Amid all the bureaucratic hustle and bustle that presently surrounds UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s travails, what ultimately matters is not the details of what the civil servant, Sue Gray, concludes in her investigation about supposedly illegal parties both the prime minister and his senior staff attended on numerous occasions during the long lockdown period — even as they sonorously cautioned the rest of the country to stay strictly quarantined. It does not really matter the precise number of illicit gatherings (which will be counted on more than two hands), which ones Johnson actually attended or whether the prime minister knew the gatherings were technically “parties” or not.

In the end, it also does not matter overmuch about the police investigation into the incidents, which have superseded the Gray report, either. If convicted of committing an actual crime, the prime minister will merely be forced to pay the equivalent of a parking ticket. All this legal and bureaucratic flummery is a sign of our mediocre age, as if the rest of us need a technocratic, expert-driven determination as to what a party is. While British officialdom may thrill to such ridiculous trivialities, they do nothing in the long term to change Johnson’s basic Marie Antoinette problem. The precise details of his alleged crimes matter far less than the fact they confirm a damning, greater truth.

Johnson, at the height of the COVID-19 tragedy and with his suffering country forced to quarantine itself from burying their dead, thought the restrictive pandemic rules he himself had formulated were ridiculous and beneath him. Or, in the genuine words of arrogant, convicted 1980s tax evader Leona Helmsley, “only the little people pay taxes.” This stigma is what will dog Johnson for the rest of his days and, in the medium term, lead to his removal as prime minister.

The story of “partygate” merely confirms a larger, already-suspected truth about the man and his character. His elitist belief that rules are for the little people is incendiary and unforgivable, coupled with the mass suffering of his people. This reality cannot be investigated away or talked away and it will not be forgotten by the British people. The Johnson premiership is living on borrowed time.

A January Times/YouGov poll confirms this. When asked the question, “Do you believe the prime minister when he said the party he was attending was a work event?” an overwhelming 70 percent of those polled said no, with a mere 13 percent believing this lamest of excuses (there are reportedly pictures showing him cradling a beer at the time). As to whether Johnson should resign over this, a large majority, 63 to 24 percent, said that he should. Only 8 percent of those polled said the prime minister had been honest about the allegations of parties in 10 Downing Street. Given that Johnson has gone from saying there were no parties, to saying if there were parties he is shocked, to saying he attended some of those parties but thought they were work events, I am incredulous that he managed the 8 percent.

The Metropolitan Police investigation, and then the release of the Gray report, will buy Johnson some time, as will the upcoming local elections. Even an internal Conservative leadership challenge (and one is coming) could see him remain in power. But all of this is merely window dressing, obscuring the larger fact that, in policy terms, the historic Johnson premiership — dominated by Brexit and the pandemic — is at an end.

The Conservative Party, in many ways the most successful modern party in the Western world, has thrived precisely because of its lack of sentimentality about its leaders once they fall upon hard times. Famously, even the invincible Margaret Thatcher, winner of three barnstorming elections, was swiftly dispatched as her popularity plummeted over the poll tax. With the Tories about 10 points behind Labour in recent polling, and with the public’s mind made up about him, it is only a matter of time until Johnson is shown the door. He simply cannot overcome his Marie Antoinette problem.

The Godfather Doctrine: A Foreign Policy Parable (Part 6); The Realist

The strategy that ultimately saves the Corleone family from the Sollozzo threat and equips it for coping with multipolarity does not come from either of the brothers who dominate family war councils at the beginning of the movie, but from Michael, the youngest and least experienced of the Don’s sons. Unlike Tom, whose labours as family lawyer have produced an exaggerated devotion to negotiation, and Sonny, whose position as untested heir apparent has produced a zeal for utilising the family arsenal, Michael has no formulaic fixation on a particular policy instrument. Instead, his overriding goal is to protect the family’s interests and save it from impending ruin by any and all means necessary. In today’s foreign policy terminology, Michael is a realist.

Viewing the world through untinted lenses, he sees that the age of dominance the family enjoyed for so long is ending. Alone among the three brothers, Michael senses that a shift is under way on the streets toward a more diffuse power arrangement, in which multiple power centres will jockey for position and influence. To survive and succeed in this new environment, Michael knows the family will have to adapt; the policy instruments it relied on before will have to be recalibrated. Unlike Tom, whose grand strategic vision centres on the concept of restoration, and Sonny, whose strategy is about retribution, Michael sees the time has come for wholesale strategic retrenchment. Three characteristics of his strategy allow it to succeed where the others fail, and could provide a blueprint for reinventing US foreign policy today.

First, Michael relinquishes the mechanistic, one-trick-pony policy approaches of his brothers in favour of a ‘toolbox’ in which soft and hard power are used in flexible combinations and as circumstances dictate. Like realists today, he knows that the family must cut the coat of its foreign policy according to the cloth of its material power base. While at various times he sides with Tom (favouring negotiations) or Sonny (favouring force), Michael understands their positions to be about tactics, and not about ultimate strategy, which for him is solely to ensure the survival and prosperity of the family. Thus he is able to use Sonny’s ‘buttonmen’ to knock out those competitors he cannot co-opt, while negotiating with the rest as Tom would like. This blending of carrots and sticks ensures that Michael is ultimately a more effective diplomat than Tom and a more successful warrior than Sonny: When he enters negotiations, it is always in the wake of a fresh battlefield victory and therefore from a position of strength; when he embarks on a new military campaign, it is always in pursuit of a specific goal that can be consolidated afterwards diplomatically.

Applied to America’s current predicament with Iran, Michael’s strategy would call for a carefully timed mixture of both carrots and sticks to dissuade Iran’s leadership from producing nuclear weapons. Carrots would include foreign investment, American diplomatic recognition, fora to discuss and address outstanding US-Iranian issues, and a nonintervention pledge from the United States. Sticks would include an international investment freeze that would bring the Islamic Republic to its economic knees. Failing this, the military option is still there, on the table. While realists accept that, in the end, the leadership in Tehran will decide the strategic course it takes, such a flexible approach prepares America for whatever Iran ultimately decides to do, and changes the odds of Iran’s acquiring nukes, while leaving the United States at the head of a considerable coalition of other powers.

This is a policy approach that realists have been advocating for years and which has been largely ignored. The neoconservative/Sonny approach has already been chronicled. The Democrats, for their part, are equally scornful of realist prescriptions. For all their talk of ‘keeping all options on the table,’ in reality the strategies that Clinton and Obama have in mind involve mostly carrots—neither is prepared to use sticks to prevent Tehran from obtaining nuclear weapons. Dennis Kucinich, though strictly a fringe candidate, spoke for the majority of Democrats when he warned the two leading candidates that any ‘threatening statements and actions against Iran’ would be viewed as ‘naive and foolhardy’ by the party base. Nor are Democrats likely to bring serious nonmilitary inducements to bear; like most EU countries—notably Germany—they fear that an economic freeze on Tehran would backfire, allowing China to capture Persian markets and provoking continued Russian opposition in the United Nations. Until Washington abandons these inhibitions, it is unlikely to be taken any more seriously by Iran than Tom was by Sollozzo.

Second, Michael understands that, no matter how strong its military or how savvy its diplomats, the Corleone family will not succeed in the multipolar environment ahead unless it learns to take better care of its allies. Like America after the Iraq War, the Mafia empire that Michael inherits after the hit on Sonny is characterised by a system of alliances on the brink of collapse. Having flocked to the Corleone colours when the war against Sollozzo broke out, the family’s allies—like America’s in Europe—have little to show for the risks they have undertaken on the family’s behalf. Exhausted by war and estranged by Sonny’s Rumsfeld-like bullying, they have begun to question whether it is still in their interests to backstop a declining superpower that is apparently not interested in retaining their loyalty.

For all his talk about diplomacy, Tom believes in the family’s total dominance; like today’s Wilsonians, he assumes that allies will continue to pay fealty to the family as a matter of course, as they have in the past. Similarly, Sonny assumes that other powers will gravitate toward the family or risk irrelevance; like most neocons, he sees allies as essentially disposable. By contrast, Michael intuitively grasps the value of family friends and the role that reciprocity plays in retaining their support for future crises. Thus he is seen offering a cigarette to Enzo, the timid neighbourhood baker whose help he enlisted, like Poland in Iraq, to protect his father at the hospital. In this, he is imitating his father, Vito, who saw alliances as the true foundation of Corleone power and was mindful of the need to tend the family’s ‘base’ of support, not only with big players like Clemenza and Tessio (Britain and France) but with smaller players like the cakemaker and the undertaker (Bulgaria and Romania) whose loyalty he is seen cultivating in the opening scenes of the movie.

For as Michael knows, even small allies could potentially prove crucial in ‘tipping the sales’ to the family’s advantage, as they will for America, once multipolarity is in full swing. Relearning the lost Sicilian art of alliance management will be necessary if Washington is to regain the confidence of the growing list of allies whose loyalty was frittered away, with little or nothing to show in return, in the sands of Iraq.

In advocating his realist course for the family, Michael is drinking deeply from the well of American geopolitical experience. True to realist form, his concerns are not some esoteric apocalyptic goal, such as the rise of global institutions bringing about everlasting peace or striving to live in a tyranny-free world; rather the welfare and the continued prosperity of his very tangible family are the object of all his efforts. Likewise for realists, the welfare of actual Americans now inhabiting an actual America is the focal point of all their endeavours. Instead of believing in a utopian and blissful future that none of us will see, Michael’s realist vocation turns his efforts toward the protection and betterment of genuine people, rather than abstractions.

Will the pandemic remake American politics?

Conrad Black’s book, “Franklin Delano Roosevelt: Champion of Freedom,” authoritatively manages to revise our image of this most famous and important man.

Attacked at the time as being a socialist or revolutionary intent on remaking American society along Bolshevik lines, Black instead sees Roosevelt for what he truly was: A great leader intent on saving capitalism from the great mistakes of the elite class itself.

But Roosevelt only had the chance to implement his New Deal programs because of the sea change that emerged in US politics following on from the Great Depression. As FDR put it: “The country needs and, unless I mistake its temper, the country demands bold, persistent experimentation” to extricate itself from the economic calamity that had befallen it.

As such, Roosevelt ushered in an era characterized by the unprecedented expansion of government into every aspect of the American people’s lives, as the prior, failed laissez-faire efforts of Herbert Hoover and the hapless Republicans had done precious little to assuage the country’s economic suffering following the stock market crash of 1929.

Roosevelt’s ascendancy, and the course correction in US politics that followed the economic crisis, led the Democrats to take the White House for five straight elections from 1932 to 1952, and to triumph in seven of the nine presidential contests leading up to 1968. This age of big government could never have come about, as Black rightly argues in his book, without the fundamental alteration of US politics that occurred as a result of the Great Depression.

Presently, the glaring failures of the US government in dealing with the COVID-19 pandemic have me wondering aloud whether another such political sea change is upon us. For the great confinement Americans have all just endured as a result of two years of failed government policy has obviously failed to work.

Locking down the country — originally designed merely as a stopgap measure to keep our imperiled health system afloat during the first, fraught days of the pandemic in March 2020 — neither managed to stop the spread of the virus nor prevent the tragically large number of deaths that followed.

At the same time, the actions of Western governments in blindly making the lockdown tactic an enduring one-size-fits-all policy — despite marked differences in how age primarily determined COVID outcomes, and even the differing characteristics of the various variants of the virus — have done uncontested damage to Western economies.

According to McKinsey, the global economy as a whole could suffer $35 trillion in losses by 2025. The great confinement failed in every respect — as a measure to stop the spread of the virus or to limit deaths — even as it nobbled the world’s economy.

It is also without doubt that the billions of dollars of new US government spending, designed to compensate a workforce that has been artificially sent home for much of the past two years, has let loose the beast of inflation on the US, which has been successfully chained for the past two generations thanks to the heroic efforts of Paul Volcker, the former chair of the Federal Reserve, and President Ronald Reagan.

As former Treasury Secretary Larry Summers presciently makes clear, the US government cannot increase new public spending by about 14-15 percent of gross domestic product in an economy running at just below pre-COVID-19 strength and not expect to stimulate inflation. It is as simple, and as devastating, as that.

The social costs of lockdown are also becoming clearer and they are equally pernicious. In terms of individual liberty, Western governments — fundamentally misunderstanding the basic Lockean nature of representative democracy, that an individual’s basic rights come from nature and not from the state — instead bewilderingly turned the system back-to-front. Only if an individual did as the government demanded were they somehow “worthy” of their rights as citizens.

The Supreme Court has seen to the worst aspects of Biden’s vaccine mandates overreach but there can be no doubt that the American governing class believed anyone not entirely swallowing the panicky, often wrong, and ever-changing pronouncements of Dr. Anthony Fauci was somehow less of an American.

At the same time the US government was becoming more authoritarian, it was becoming less competent. There has been a huge upsurge in violent crime throughout the nation, while teachers’ unions have shamefully emerged as the villain of the pandemic, collectively looking for any excuse to manage hard-pressed parents’ homeschooling rather than actually doing their jobs.

Everyone who has been around children for about five minutes recently knows that no amount of the grade inflation to come can obscure the painful reality that we adults have morally failed the next generation, and that both socially and in terms of actual learning they are years behind. We will be paying for this for decades.

Indeed, what people will remember above all else from this historic global crisis is not the COVID-19 tragedy itself, horrible as it has been. Rather, above everything else, they will recount the utter ineptitude and fecklessness of the governing elite, who made a terrible situation far worse.

The 2022 mid-terms will surely lead to large Republican gains. But if I am right, what is coming is far more than this. There may well be a political watershed to come, another FDR-like sea change — and the US left-leaning elite is not going to like this.

This post was originally published in Arab News.

The US and Qatar will try to save a feckless Europe from itself

Without a doubt, the Ukraine crisis has gone global. The U.S. is reaching out to trusted allies, near and far. The emir of Qatar, Sheikh Tamin bin Hamad Al Thani, has been invited to the White House today to confer with President Biden about saving another ally from possible ruin: the feckless European Union. 

Despite this seemingly complicated diplomatic interplay, the reason for this unconventional strategy is simple enough. Qatar boasts the world’s second largest liquified natural gas (LNG) export capacity, and the United States ranks third. Together, they are trying to make up the difference in case Russia, the world’s sixth largest exporter, turns off the taps on Europe, or Gazprom, the Russian gas behemoth, is sanctioned. If Russia were to invade Ukraine, and significant sanctions were then put in place by the West to punish the Kremlin, playing the energy card would become Russia’s geo-economic weapon of choice. 

The EU has been warned by political risk analysts about finding itself in precisely this fix for years — that the Kremlin someday could weaponize its gas pipelines flowing into Europe. Russia supplies 40 percent of the EU’s natural gas, and the share is even greater for Germany, the economic motor of Europe and the continent’s single most important country. Such Russian domination of Europe’s energy needs provides it with a foreign policy near-veto over the EU, automatically limiting how hard Europe and Germany can decide to crack down on their primary gas supplier.

For the past generation Europe was preoccupied with abandoning fossil fuels, as it obsessed about global warming, yet it blindly let itself become utterly dependent on Russian natural gas. Russian President Vladimir Putin started limiting the gas supply to Europe last autumn. As a result, the EU is in great danger of suffering through its worst energy crisis in memory, which could plunge Europe’s fragile economies into deep recession. 

This is where Qatar comes in. President Biden reportedly has asked the emir to reroute his country’s massive natural gas exports toward a stricken Europe, should this prove necessary. Qatar, by far the world’s lowest cost producer of LNG and a staunch American ally, is prepared to discuss doing so, but the process of saving Europe from itself will be difficult. In 2011, following the Fukushima nuclear disaster in Japan, Qatar — citing the special circumstances — rerouted natural gas supplies to aid Tokyo. Biden will need to persuade the emir that the current conditions represent a threat of a similar magnitude.

The White House also will have to leverage the approval of Qatar’s primary Asian natural gas importers — Japan, South Korea, India and Pakistan — to make such a dramatic energy move. This is inherently tricky because most of the world’s natural gas supply is bound up in long-term deals. Fortunately for the U.S., most of these importers are allies and at least will be open to Biden’s pitch.  

Even with Qatar’s steadfast support, and assuming the Gulf state’s natural gas importers are receptive to the Biden administration’s policy pitch — a big if — further diversification will be necessary to rescue Europe. The Biden administration is working with increasingly frantic European allies to find additional natural gas suppliers in North Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia, and in the U.S. itself.

Still, all of these policy efforts put together are not enough to immediately substitute for a large disruption in the natural gas supply from Russia. Hopefully, the cumulative effect of these energy moves might be enough to diffuse a ticking economic time bomb. 

Finding workarounds for Russia’s energy stranglehold on Europe will require complex multilateral diplomacy, and goodwill. It also will require allies, such as the Qataris, willing to meet Washington more than halfway. The emir’s visit makes him the first head of state in the Gulf region to personally visit the White House during Biden’s administration, an indicator of how close the U.S.-Qatar relationship has become, and a potent illustration of the power a low-cost energy producer has in our fragmented world. The emir of Qatar is wading into the roiling, shark-infested waters of great power competition — a clear sign of Qatar’s ambitions and a big test of its alliance with the U.S.

However, even as some allies are rightly rewarded, others must take heed. A brutal rule lies at the heart of international relations: Either you master history, or history masters you. Europe has nonsensically ignored its own energy dependence on the rival next door and now is paying the price. 

A precondition of Europe being saved from itself must involve a real rethinking of its entire energy policy, which is painfully overdue. Such a new policy direction would see that natural gas (as well as nuclear power) is an important step on the road to ultimately dealing with climate change, and one that also values security of supply, because in the end geopolitics fundamentally matters.

Those who may save Europe from the consequences of its ruinous energy policy — including the U.S. and Qatar — must be rewarded as the continent diversifies away from its unhealthy dependence on Russian natural gas. After all, there is a limit to the number of times that the Old Continent can be saved from itself.

This post was originally published in The Hill.

The Godfather; A Foreign Policy Parable (Part 5)

Shoot First and Ask Questions Later

Sonny, the Don’s undisputed heir, is the most shaken by the attempted hit on his father, whom he venerates. His simplistic response to the crisis is to advocate ‘toughness’ through military action, a one-note policy prescription for waging righteous war against the rest of the ungrateful Mafia world.

Disdaining Tom’s pleas that business will suffer, Sonny’s damn-the-torpedoes approach belies a deep-seated fear that the only way to re-establish the family’s dominance is to eradicate all possible future threats to it, however remote. While such a strategy makes emotional sense following the attempted hit on his father, it runs counter to the long-term interests of the family. Vito himself knew that threats against his position were a fact of life; while his policy revolved around minimising them, he well knew that, in a world governed by power, they could never be entirely eliminated. As the Don put it to Michael, ‘Men cannot afford to be careless.’

By contrast, Sonny’s Neo-conservative approach is built around the strategically utopian notion that risk itself can be eliminated from life altogether though the relentless—and if necessary, preemptive—use of violence.

In Sonny, Tom is confronted with the cinematic archetype of the modern-day Neo-conservative hardliner. Their resulting feud resembles nothing so much as the pitched political warfare between Wilsonians and Neo-conservatives that has come to dominate the American political landscape:

NEOCON: ‘Hey, get this, Sollozzo wants to talk—can you imagine the nerve on that son of a bitch? Last night he makes a hit on pop, and today he wants to talk…’

WILSONIAN: ‘We oughta hear what they have to say.’

NEOCON: ‘No, no more. Not this time, Consigliere; no more meetings, no more discussions, no more Sollozzo tricks.’

WILSONIAN: ‘Sonny, this is business, not personal.’

NEOCON: ‘Well then business will have to suffer, alright? And do me a favour: no more advice on how to patch things up—just help me win alright?’

Where Tom sees Sollozzo as a reasonable if aggressive businessman whose concerns, like those of previous challengers, can be accommodated through compromise and conciliation, Sonny sees an existential threat—a clear and present danger that, like Iran in the view of many Republicans, must be swiftly cauterised.

One can imagine Sonny’s shoot-first-and-ask-questions-later approach would meet with the approval of such neoconservatives such as Norman Podhoretz and Michael Ledeen. Confronted with the Iran crisis, Sonny would urge an immediate military strike, primarily as a way to cut through ambiguities and arrive at some sort of moral and strategic clarity, however illusory. As with the Neo-conservatives, so desperate to remove a possible emerging nuclear threat from Iran, it is unlikely that Sonny would make a cost-benefit analysis of such a military strike.

What, Ahmadinejad is not even in control of Tehran’s nuclear program? Don’t waste time, says Sonny. A US air strike would fail to accomplish anything of lasting military value and would only succeed in uniting Iran and the region against America? Stop being weak, says Sonny. A failed trike would imperil American allies in the region, such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the Gulf States, Morocco, and Egypt, directly benefitting al-Qaeda and Isis? I knew you didn’t have the guts to do this, says Sonny. As is true for neoconservatives, Sonny would be unlikely to let facts get in the way of his desire for military action, however wrongheaded.

Instead, by starting a gangland free-for-all in the wake of the hit on his father, Sonny unwittingly severs long-standing family alliances and unites much of the rest of the Mafia world against the Corleones. The resulting war, like America’s Iraq debacle, is one of choice rather than strategic necessity. As has been true with empires since the beginning of time, Sonny’s rash instinct to use military power to solve his structural problems merely hastens the family’s decline.

As the past few years have shown, military intervention for its own sake, without a corresponding political plan, leads only to disaster. Yearning for the moral clarity that the Corleones’ past dominance had given them—a dominance not dissimilar to that enjoyed by America during the Cold War—Sonny cannot begin to comprehend that the era that made his military strategy possible has come to an end. Blinded by a militant moralism bereft of strategic insight, he proves an easy target for his foes.

The Neo-conservatism that Sonny espouses grew out of a movement that has been far less prominent in American history than either Tom’s Wilsonianism or Michael’s realism. Emanating from disillusioned Trotskyites, such as Irving Kristol, who had belatedly seen the error of their ways in Stalin’s excesses, these fierce Cold Warriors have remained true to a core principle of their earlier allegiance—permanent revolution, this time for a democratic world.

As Trotsky said of socialism, only when the whole world hewed firmly to a single ideological line could the planet be genuinely safe for sustained peace and prosperity. Modern-day neocons, substituting democracy for socialism, evidenced by President George W. Bush’s second inaugural address declaring that America cannot really be secure while tyranny exists in the world. The problem with this view is that such an end of history does not correspond with any period in the global record. It is a formula for perennial warfare, living beyond the country’s means, and a quick decline for America, still the greatest hope of the world.

Sonny’s fate is emblematic of Neo-conservatism’s follies. Unwisely, and against the advice of his mother, Sonny attempts to arbitrate the escalating domestic disputes between his sister, Connie, and her abusive husband, Carlo Ricci, failing to see that the beatings his sister endured from Carlo came at the behest of Don Barzini, the Corleones’ closest peer competitor. For Sonny’s reaction to all the evils of the world, whether beyond his ability to solve or not, is entirely predictable: ‘Attack.’ Unilaterally rushing to avenge his sister by pummelling Carlo, Sonny is struck down by his legion of foes, his body riddled with bullets. As has proven true for neoconservatives over Iraq, there is a depressing logic to his hit. In place of understanding the world, Sonny based his strategy on accosting it; the world’s striking back, as happened in Iraq, is an obvious conclusion.

Written with A. Wess Mitchell

We must stop pretending the EU is a great power

This is a tale of two delusional think tank meetings I have recently attended, illustrating how far gone is most political risk analysis regarding the status of the EU. Cheerleading has taken the place of thinking, as the simple fact is that Brussels is funding many of the supposedly independent observers at such conclaves. To expect critical thinking from “experts” whose financial imperatives revolve around keeping the EU’s mandarins happy is to expect too much.

At the first meeting, I found myself sitting on a panel with an American Wilsonian. He was representing the Democratic Party view of US relations with China, while I represented the Republican Party view. After a good discussion, questions came from the primarily European audience. The first revolved around the fact that the questioner wanted to know where the EU fits into the strategic picture of the Sino-American cold war, as wasn’t it so that Brussels must be counted as the world’s third great superpower?

Even though it was a Zoom call, my Wilsonian counterpart — whom I agreed with over almost nothing — and I exchanged ironic glances. Finally, for all his innate pro-EU inclinations, he brutally told the questioner the truth: The EU, while a trading superpower and a huge internal market, simply doesn’t play at the global strategic level as a great power (let alone a superpower), as it is less and less economically dynamic, is endemically politically divided and is militarily (other than France) impotent. In the shocked silence that followed, I quipped that I wanted to cede all my time to my Democratic counterpart for having the temerity to tell the brainwashed audience the truth — that the EU simply isn’t a great power.

If this is so, my second think tank meeting focused on the nub of the problem: A mercantilist, neutralist, isolationist-leaning Germany. In standard fashion, the German think tank denizen sent to debate me made all the usual excuses; while I am right to be critical, Germany (in that most galling of phrases) “would now do its homework,” easily overcoming a generation’s-worth of historical and empirical evidence to the contrary, and would decisively right its ship of state over the coming months.

Exasperated, and tired of the analytical lying at cocktail parties, I brutally interjected that the reality is that Germany would do nothing over the next year and change nothing, as its people prefer their cosseted lifestyle (and genteel decline) to the real sacrifices that would be involved in paying for a relevant military and crafting a common European foreign policy. I was met by hateful stares and a sullen, unchallenged silence, for what could they say, given the last decades of Berlin’s holiday from history?

Crises intellectually clarify, even for the most obtuse observers. Two recent challenges to Brussels from the world’s revisionist powers, China and Russia, ought to make plain that wishful thinking has taken the place of facts-based political risk assessments of an EU that is so much less than meets the eye.

First, tiny Lithuania — to the fury of Beijing — has decided to favor Taiwan in the crafting of its foreign and economic policy. China responded by putting pressure on Vilnius and defying the EU, particularly Germany, to do anything about this. While in the past few days, the EU launched a legal action against China at the World Trade Organization (WTO) after Beijing restricted or blocked imports from and exports to Lithuania, Berlin responded precisely as I would have predicted — that is, in a neutralist, isolationist, mercantilist manner — and not as EU cheerleaders would have it. Glumly aware, as an export-driven superpower, that China, for the fifth year in a row, is its largest export destination, Germany is pressing Brussels to tone down its criticism of China and to de-escalate the controversy.

Major German companies, particularly carmakers heavily dependent on trade with Beijing, have warned Vilnius that they will pull out of Lithuania unless the dispute is quickly settled. For, despite all its usual blather about how much the EU means to it, when push comes to shove and with its now economic interests on the line, Berlin has seen to its commercial interests  at the expense of European unity.

Likewise, over the Ukraine crisis, in a basic way President Vladimir Putin is airing his grievances. As such, in the earliest days of the crisis, Moscow met with the US, NATO and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, not with the EU.

Why should he? In practical terms, Moscow met great power to superpower (the US), with the world’s most important military alliance (NATO) and with the largest gathering of transatlantic states (the OSCE). The EU simply does not play a major role in strategic terms; for Putin to prioritize meeting with Brussels would have been a colossal waste of time. While a shocked Brussels looked impotently on (and I am shocked that they are shocked), Putin made it clear that, in a crisis, the EU simply does not have the relevance its cheerleaders dream of. Nor is this state of affairs likely to change.

Instead of swallowing comforting, if delusional, fairy tales about its far-flung importance, it is time to analytically shout from the rooftops the obvious: That the EU emperor simply isn’t wearing any clothes.

This post was originally published in Arab News.